

1 **Intellectual Property Protections and Profits Limit Global Vaccine Access**

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6 Abstract

7 Since December 2019, more than 580 million cases of COVID-19 have resulted in more than 6.4 million
8 deaths globally. The COVID-19 pandemic has had devastating impacts on human health as well as
9 national and international economies. Beginning in 2020, highly effective medical products were
10 developed to treat and prevent COVID-19. Vaccines such as those developed by Pfizer-BioNTech and
11 Moderna have demonstrated high efficacy in preventing COVID-19 infection in clinical trials and offer
12 flexibility in designing new vaccines to address variants. However, these companies have been unwilling
13 to share patents and technologies with other countries to scale up production worldwide. It is essential
14 that the public health community advocate for global access to life-saving biotechnologies, including the
15 manufacture and distribution of vaccines, therapies, and diagnostics to limit morbidity and mortality from
16 COVID-19, its variants, and newly emerging viruses such as monkeypox. We must strengthen our clinical
17 and public health infrastructure in preparation for future outbreaks and pandemics. APHA calls on the
18 World Trade Organization to reconsider and waive patent enforcement to encourage technology transfer
19 and redistribution of expertise, technical assistance, resources, and finances and, failing that, to allow
20 countries to act independently without penalty; calls on pharmaceutical companies to voluntarily pledge
21 nonenforcement of intellectual property rights and share the technology needed to produce treatments and
22 vaccines; and calls on the broader public health community to support education and outreach efforts
23 intended to address misinformation, reluctance, and other potential barriers to uptake of and access to
24 current and future vaccines.

25

26 Relationship to Existing APHA Policy Statements

- 27 ● APHA Policy Statement 201512: Ensuring That Trade Agreements Promote Public Health
- 28 ● APHA Policy Statement 20021: Int'l Trade Policy Issues of Improving Access to Drugs for Life-
29 Threatening and Disabling Diseases (archived)
- 30 ● APHA Policy Statement 200121: Threats to Global Health and Equity: The General Agreement
31 on Trade in Services (GATS), and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
- 32 ● APHA Policy Statement 20218: Call for Urgent Actions to Address Health Inequities in the U.S.
33 Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic and Response

34

35 Problem Statement

36 Since December 2019, more than 580 million cases of COVID-19 have resulted in more than 6.4 million
37 deaths globally.[1] The COVID-19 pandemic has had devastating impacts on human health as well as
38 national and international economies. It is estimated that there were 18.2 million excess deaths
39 attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021, with potential causes being underreporting,
40 lack of access to testing, and increased mortality from other diseases because of pandemic-related
41 changes in behavior or in access to care.[2]

42
43 However, beginning in 2020, highly effective medical products were identified and developed to treat and
44 prevent COVID-19. Vaccines using mRNA technology, such as those developed by Pfizer-BioNTech and
45 Moderna, have been highly efficacious in preventing severe COVID-19 infection in clinical trials.[3] By
46 conservative estimates, COVID-19 vaccines prevented 14.4 million deaths globally in 2021 and could
47 have prevented many more had even modest vaccine distribution goals been met.[4] Unfortunately, global
48 vaccine distribution has been characterized by stark inequities. COVID-19 has exposed issues in the
49 world distribution system and in our ability to respond to global diseases. It is essential that the public
50 health community address inequities in global access to life-saving biotechnologies, including the
51 manufacture and distribution of vaccines, new therapeutics, and tests. The U.S. Food and Drug
52 Administration (FDA) has recommended that, in light of new COVID-19 variants such as BA.4 and
53 BA.5, vaccines should be modified to limit morbidity and mortality and that researchers should continue
54 to seek an overarching vaccine for all COVID types.[5] In addition, some vaccines currently being
55 developed, such as Corbevax, Soberana 02, and Novavax, may have logistical, therapeutic, and financial
56 advantages in the long term.

57
58 Therapeutics to limit morbidity and mortality from COVID-19 are also chasing a moving target as
59 mutations in the virus can create resistance to medications such as injectable Veklury (remdesivir) and
60 monoclonal antibodies (bebtelovimab) and oral Paxlovid (nirmatrelvir and ritonavir).[6] Medication to
61 prevent infection includes Evusheld (tixagevimab and cilgavimab). The ability to “test and treat” requires
62 available diagnostics and medications that are not available in most of the world.[7] Increased production
63 of new treatments and diagnostics will be needed to respond in a timely fashion. This need has been
64 recognized in a recent G7 communique that pledges support for the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness
65 Innovations (CEPI) and the goal of the “100 Days Mission.”[8] This support must become real as
66 emerging diseases will bring new challenges. For example, prior to COVID-19 CEPI’s work focused on
67 developing vaccines for Ebola virus, Lassa virus, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus, Nipah
68 virus, Rift Valley fever virus, and Chikungunya virus; it has more than 20 vaccine candidates against
69 these pathogens in development. The mRNA technology offers a new tool for vaccine development and

70 may yet show effectiveness in preventing HIV as Moderna contributes to new clinical trials.[9] However,
71 as with the HIV epidemic, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has prioritized intellectual property (IP)
72 rights and profit over widespread access to and production of therapeutics. This has limited the global
73 availability of vaccines as high-income countries (HICs) have kept vaccines for domestic use, provided
74 vaccines near expiration, failed to adequately fund international organizations, and charged low- and
75 middle-income countries (LMICs) more than they can pay.[10,11]

76
77 Global vaccine disparities between high-income and low- and middle-income countries: Since the start of
78 the pandemic, disparate international responses have affected LMICs disproportionately. The World
79 Health Organization (WHO) reports that, globally, 164 vaccine doses have been administered per 100
80 people and that 63.46 per 100 people are fully vaccinated with the last dose of the primary series.[1] In
81 addition, 28.96 per 100 people have received a vaccine booster globally. But there is wide geographic
82 variation. The number of total vaccines administered per 100 people in the Western Pacific, Europe, the
83 Americas, and Southeast Asia is more than 1.4 times that of the Eastern Mediterranean and 4 times that of
84 Africa.[1] Also, the number of individuals fully vaccinated with the last doses of the primary series per
85 100 population in the Western Pacific, Europe, the Americas, and Southeast Asia is more than 1.3 times
86 that of the Eastern Mediterranean and more than 2.8 times that of Africa.[1] Finally, the number of people
87 boosted per 100 population in Europe, the Americas, and the Western Pacific is more than 1.5 times that
88 of Southeast Asia, more than 1.9 times that of the Eastern Mediterranean, and more than 11 times that of
89 Africa.[1] Solidarity among HICs has made possible the development of valuable technologies yielding
90 more COVID-19 vaccines than they can feasibly distribute. Meanwhile, LMICs are desperate for the
91 vaccines and technology needed to prevent infections and death.[11] Health is recognized as a human
92 right in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but under our current profit- and
93 competition-based global health care system IP is afforded more rights than human lives. This hoarding
94 by HICs has been characterized as “vaccine apartheid” by Fatima Hass, director of the Health Justice
95 Initiative in South Africa.[12,13]

96
97 Harms of vaccine apartheid—From variants to racist immigration policy: Failure to provide vaccines, IP,
98 and the technology to manufacture them worldwide will mean ongoing public health crises in both the
99 short and the long term. In the short term, ongoing spread of COVID-19 in countries with low vaccination
100 rates may lead to the development of additional variants. Existing vaccines prevent infection and
101 transmission of the alpha and delta variants.[14] Booster shots provide protection against infection from
102 the original Omicron COVID-19 variants.[2] Existing vaccines are less effective at preventing infection
103 for variants BA.4 and BA.5 but are effective in preventing severe illness and death. Infections provide an

104 opportunity for the virus to replicate, with more severe infections and sicker hosts (such as those who are
105 immunocompromised), leading to longer periods of active infection.[15] This increases the likelihood of
106 multiple mutations arising that could be more virulent, pathogenic, or capable of immune escape.[16]
107 Preventing infections with vaccinations and other public health measures is crucial to preventing the
108 evolution of new coronavirus variants.

109
110 New variants have been used to justify racist immigration and travel policies. For example, the Title 42
111 policy was invoked in March 2020 to expel and return to danger individuals seeking asylum under the
112 guise of protecting the public health of U.S. citizens from COVID-19. This racist and inhumane policy
113 was maintained even under a new administration and continues to be supported by Congress. The
114 ongoing spread of variants exposes the uselessness of this order.[17] Travel bans were instituted against
115 South Africa and other African countries in December 2021 in response to the Omicron variant, even
116 though the variant had already been found in the United States and in other countries that were not placed
117 under a travel ban. Prominent public health experts denounced this unscientific act.[18] Ongoing variants
118 and low vaccination rates provide cover for these racist policies, which discourage global cooperation and
119 sharing of information about new variants; they also affect the ability of LMICs to acquire supplies and
120 medical expertise.[18]

121
122 In the long term, we are certain to face future pandemics as deforestation and factory farming lead to
123 spillover of viruses from animals to people.[19] If we fail now to implement technological advances,
124 manufacturing capabilities, and distribution systems at the global level, we will compromise our ability to
125 recognize and respond in the future.[20] We will continue to experience events such as the cholera
126 outbreaks in Haiti and Yemen and the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on measles
127 vaccinations in 37 low-income countries.[21] The initial and ongoing interruptions in childhood
128 vaccination for measles (and other diseases) due to the COVID-19 pandemic have led to spikes in global
129 measles cases.[22,23] The lack of public health infrastructure will also worsen outcomes of disasters
130 caused by climate change and wars. Showing global solidarity by building resilient and capable health
131 systems is a crucial part of long-term health and safety. When, and if, a universal coronavirus vaccine is
132 developed, the ability to make it available globally will also depend on current decisions to share
133 information and technology and build infrastructure. We must learn from this pandemic that “COVID-19
134 anywhere is COVID-19 everywhere”; when it comes to infectious diseases, national and global interests
135 are truly the same.[20]

136

137 The current vaccine apartheid is part of a larger global social, economic, and political system that
138 maximizes the rate of profit of large corporations, including pharmaceutical companies, and ignores long-
139 term harms. Seventeen large corporations, such as Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, Amazon, Visa, Microsoft,
140 and Google, made \$85 billion in extra profits during 2020. Oxfam estimates that a pandemic profit tax
141 (similar to the profit tax used during World War II) would cover the cost of universal vaccination
142 research, manufacturing, and delivery as well as fund sick leave, food, and other support.[24] The current
143 global social, economic, and political system also allows damaging environmental conditions to promote
144 diseases. There are many options for primary prevention of COVID-19 and similar zoonotic
145 infections.[25,26] Bernstein et al. estimate that the world could save \$106 billion in global gross national
146 income if the number of outbreaks decreased by 50%.[27] To achieve this outcome, surveillance of
147 zoonotic diseases would create a “pathogen catalog” to identify what vaccines need to be developed.
148 Practices that reduce deforestation and wild animal farming and trade, increase veterinary care, and
149 implement more sustainable food production can reduce spillover.[27]

150
151 Finally, as the need to vaccinate the world is critical to the long-term healthy survival of humanity,
152 education campaigns to combat vaccine reluctance and misinformation should be developed alongside
153 testing and treatment initiatives. It is crucial that trusted public health institutions and practitioners in each
154 country engage in proactive, antiracist, evidence-based campaigns to educate the public and encourage
155 vaccine acceptance.[28]

156
157 Effects of supply chain issues on vaccinations: Highly effective vaccines cannot provide protection if they
158 are not administered to individuals, and doing so requires an adequate supply chain. In our global health
159 architecture, supply chain management dictates who does and does not get vaccinated based on where
160 they are born and live. Supply chain issues include limited vaccine manufacturing, supply-side
161 bottlenecks (raw materials and consumables), cold-chain storage infrastructure, training, and support.[21]
162 Establishing local manufacturing hubs will not only curb the cost of delivering vaccines to people in
163 LMICs but also help combat challenges associated with export bans, vaccine hoarding by HICs, and
164 delivery of vaccines before they expire; all of this will contribute to achieving global herd immunity more
165 quickly.[29]

166
167 Economic impact on low-wage and informal workers: Vaccine access and uptake have economic effects
168 on the global economy, particularly harming LMICs. Although advanced economies suffer from both
169 trade and economic costs of the pandemic, most of these costs stem from their trade linkages with
170 unvaccinated countries that limit exports and imports.[30] These declines are amplified through both

171 domestic and global input-output linkages. Because in the near term global supply chains are fixed under
172 price stickiness, there is no reallocation of labor across sectors or substitution between intermediate
173 inputs.[30] Even in HICs, establishments paying the lowest average wages and the lowest-wage workers
174 experienced the steepest decline in employment and are still the furthest from recovery.[31] Moreover,
175 because of the race and class divisions in the United States and other HICs, the burden of disease and
176 economic downturn in those countries falls disproportionately on poor, Black, and Latinx workers.

177
178 Loss of life among health workers was a serious blow to the global workforce. For example, more than
179 100 Ugandan health workers died between March 2020 and July 2021.[32] U.S. public health workers
180 also suffered high rates of depression and other mental health disorders exacerbated by long working
181 hours without adequate breaks.[33] Beyond health workers, the pandemic has had serious consequences
182 for workers in terms of morbidity and mortality. In the United States, data on long COVID are sobering,
183 as Brookings reported in January 2022 that it is the cause of as many as 4 million people being out of
184 work, costing at least \$170 billion a year.[34] A study of California transportation workers revealed
185 higher rates of COVID-19 than in other industries, ranging from more than three to five times the rate
186 among other groups from January to May 2022, requiring more targeted vaccination efforts in this group
187 of workers.[35]

188
189 The COVID-19 pandemic has had a particularly harsh impact on workers in the informal economy owing
190 to a lack of labor protections, social safety nets, and access to government relief. The International Labour
191 Organization (ILO) estimates that informal workers represent around 60% of the world's employed
192 population, equal to 2 billion workers.[36] At the beginning of the pandemic, the ILO projected that 1.6
193 billion workers could lose up to 60% of their earnings because of lockdown restrictions and reduced
194 demand for their labor.[37] A 12-city longitudinal study conducted among informal workers in summer
195 2020 confirmed the magnitude of earning losses, particularly among domestic workers and street vendors
196 as well as women, who have been affected disproportionately.[38] The extent to which affected workers
197 were able to access government relief varied widely depending on the existing social protection
198 infrastructure, the presence of grassroots organizations, and eligibility requirements and application
199 procedures; almost 60% of surveyed workers did not receive government-provided cash or food
200 relief.[38]

201
202 Corporate greed as a driver of vaccine inequity: Pharmaceutical companies base the price of medical
203 products on what the market will bear to maximize their profits rather than on the cost of research and
204 development (R&D) or manufacturing.[39] Under the current paradigm for vaccine manufacturing and

205 delivery, private companies have created artificial scarcity by concealing IP rights in the name of
206 protecting innovation.[40] In the first year of availability of their vaccines, Pfizer and Moderna earned
207 approximately \$54 billion from sales of their mRNA vaccines; Pfizer's projected profits for November
208 2021 were \$36 billion, and Moderna's were \$18 billion.[41]

209
210 Currently, the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
211 requires signatory countries to allow pharmaceutical companies to have monopoly patent protections for
212 their medical products.[42] The TRIPS Agreement is a barrier to equitable and timely access to novel
213 medical products, including COVID-19 vaccines. LMICs such as India and Brazil are among of the
214 largest vaccine manufacturers in the world and thus have existing infrastructure to produce enough
215 vaccines to dramatically increase COVID-19 vaccination rates among their populations.[43] Yet, these
216 countries are unable to autonomously produce mRNA COVID-19 vaccines because of IP restrictions put
217 in place through the TRIPS Agreement. In a global public health crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic,
218 private companies should not hold this type of power over supply, price, and distribution of vaccines.

219
220 Evidence-Based Strategies to Address the Problem

221 Waive the TRIPS Agreement and share access to technology for vaccine development: The WTO can
222 temporarily waive patent protections under the TRIPS Agreement. The production processes for COVID-
223 19 vaccines are protected by patent thickets, and it is important to waive enforcement of all patents
224 surrounding the production and use of the vaccines.[44] A coalition of public health and international
225 justice organizations has called on the WTO to waive patent protections under the TRIPS Agreement as a
226 necessary first step to ensuring greater global vaccine access.[45] India and South Africa formally
227 requested a waiver of the TRIPS Agreement for the prevention, containment, and treatment of COVID-19
228 in October 2020, and now more than 100 countries support it.[46] Nevertheless, the WTO refused to
229 support it again in June 2022.

230
231 There have been exceptions to the enforcement of patent protections under the TRIPS Agreement. Article
232 31 allows governments to issue licenses to use an existing patent without a patent holder's consent. The
233 exception was used 144 times between 2001 and 2016 to create flexibilities for 89 countries.[47] Two
234 decades ago, when the HIV/AIDS global pandemic threatened the stability and existence of some LMICs,
235 the Doha Declaration of 2001 addressed the barriers that the TRIPS Agreement posed to global public
236 health. It enabled developing countries to provide access for their populations to effective antiretroviral
237 medications without bankrupting their health care budgets and has had a substantial impact on HIV/AIDS
238 morbidity and mortality beginning a generation ago and lasting to the present time.[48] However, this

239 exception to the TRIPS Agreement is insufficient for addressing current public health needs because
240 “after applying for an exception, exporting countries must prove products go only to destination nations,
241 are readily identifiable based on variations of color or shape, and include only product necessary to meet
242 requirements of an eligible country; importing nations must notify the TRIPS council of receipt.”[47]
243 Other efforts to free IP are sought worldwide, showing the importance of bypassing patent protections.
244 The World Intellectual Property Organization has established a COVID-19 search facility within its
245 global database.[49] The tool offers predefined search strings that support the searching of COVID-19-
246 related patent information. Regional patent organizations (such as the European Patent Office) and
247 regional technical cooperation initiatives (such as PRO SUR/PROSUL, bringing together Argentina,
248 Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay), as well as national IP
249 authorities, have developed similar tools.[50] Application of regulations in the General Agreement on
250 Trades and Services, including e-commerce, may also be useful. Moderna did indicate that the company
251 will not enforce patents for its vaccine but has not shared the knowledge and technology needed for others
252 to produce the vaccine themselves.[51]

253

254 Because LMICs face inadequate vaccine supplies, diagnostic capabilities, health technology, and
255 infrastructure, the TRIPS waiver alone is unlikely to achieve the expected impact without transfer of
256 expertise relating to COVID-19 vaccines.

257

258 WTO members are free to regulate their service sectors to pursue their domestic policy objectives.
259 However, Article VI:4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (Domestic Regulations)
260 calls for the Council for Trade in Services to develop any necessary disciplines to ensure that domestic
261 regulation in services does not create unnecessary trade barriers.[52] GATS requires treatment of services
262 or suppliers of all other members that is “no less favourable than that accorded to like services and
263 services suppliers of any other country as long as GATS applies to services produced, distributed,
264 marketed, sold or delivered electronically, as well as to services involved in the marketing, sale, and
265 delivery of goods through e-commerce such as telehealth.”[53] Many regional trade agreements trade in
266 services beyond the GATS service provision and regulate a broader investment framework, including
267 investment in IP.

268

269 The provisions under GATS recognize that regulations may affect trade in services adversely, especially
270 health services, and therefore undermine health equity. It is crucial that the authorization process toward
271 supplying a service follows good regulatory practices and, thereby, does not constitute an unnecessary
272 impediment to business activity. The full implementation of GATS will benefit small- and medium-sized

273 enterprises for which navigating regulatory procedures can be costly and complex. Establishing common
274 approaches and recommendations while providing precise and timely information across developed and
275 developing countries would enhance trade and health system resilience in LMICs.

276
277 Develop infrastructure in low- and middle-income countries: Development of vaccine manufacturing in
278 LMICs is essential. Although many LMICs currently face challenges such as limited availability of
279 diagnostic tools, health technology, and infrastructure, they can address these challenges with adequate
280 support. Investment in infrastructure is essential to responding to the COVID-19 pandemic and also
281 strengthens our ability to respond to future emerging public health threats such as monkeypox. Experts
282 concurrently identified the need to expand infrastructure for producing medical products while responding
283 to HIV.[54]

284
285 Technology transfer is necessary for the development of manufacturing in LMICs, including a cold chain
286 for newer mRNA vaccines. Through the power of the executive branch, the U.S. government has the
287 authority under the Defense Procurement Act to require Moderna to share vaccine technology with the
288 WHO mRNA hubs.[55] The act has been enforced during this pandemic to increase the production of
289 vaccines to be distributed to people in the United States and to help vaccine manufacturers in the country
290 secure the necessary materials to produce vaccines more quickly.[56]

291
292 There are multiple examples of the capacity for such developments in LMICs. In 2017, an optimized
293 immunization supply chain model was implemented in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, resulting
294 in a 34% cost reduction and no recurrences of immunizations being out of stock.[57] The country was
295 then able to address Ebola in 2019 by setting up an ultracold chain using backup power generators.[41,58]
296 Examples of technology transfer from HICs to LMICs include the oral cholera vaccine and typhoid
297 conjugate vaccine technologies, which were shared with vaccine manufacturers in several developing
298 countries.[59] In spite of India's ban on exporting vaccine technology from the Serum Institute of India,
299 Bangladesh has become self-reliant in its response to the pandemic. Icepta Vaccine Limited, a vaccine
300 manufacturing facility in Bangladesh, will be cooperating with Sinopharm to produce a viable COVID-19
301 vaccine.[60] As of December 2021, more than 50% of the Bangladeshi population had received one dose
302 of the vaccine.[60] In South Africa, work to reverse engineer mRNA vaccines was nearly complete at the
303 time of this writing. Along with the identification of the Omicron variant, this further demonstrates the
304 scientific expertise available around the world. While significant manufacturing capacity exists in LMICs,
305 international trade agreements hinder their ability to leverage patent-protected technology. Furthermore,
306 trade agreements may serve to discourage a country from investing in pharmaceutical manufacturing if

307 such technology does not already exist in the country. Given that vaccines currently being developed may
308 have therapeutic, logistical, or financial advantages, it benefits the global population and economies to
309 diversify and increase manufacturing capacity in LMICs as well as HICs.

310
311 Address misinformation and potential vaccine reluctance: As the need to vaccinate the world is critical to
312 the long-term healthy survival of humanity, education campaigns to combat vaccine reluctance and
313 misinformation must be developed alongside testing and treatment initiatives. According to a World Bank
314 working paper on sub-Saharan Africa, “Vaccine acceptance ranges from nearly universal in Ethiopia
315 (97.9%) to below what would likely be required for herd immunity in Mali (64.5%).... Safety concerns
316 about the vaccine in general and its side effects emerge as the primary reservations toward a COVID-19
317 vaccine across countries.”[61] In addition, the failure to distribute vaccines in a timely way and support
318 local production contributes to distrust of the product. As stated in a December 2021 Lancet editorial,
319 “Although the global community recognizes the need for global vaccine coverage to end the COVID-19
320 pandemic, it exhibits no firm commitment to expedite vaccine deployment to the African
321 continent...which further reinforces and perpetuates vaccine hesitancy.”[62] The editorial went on to
322 make several proposals to improve the situation, such as making use of the resources of the African
323 Centres for Disease Control and Prevention and WHO and sharing experiences and lessons from other
324 vaccination efforts such as that involving Ebola.

325
326 Implement broad social and economic approaches to prevent future pandemics and mitigate COVID-19:
327 Understanding that the current vaccine apartheid and the conditions that led to this pandemic are directly
328 related to the larger economic and political system—capitalism—is crucial in considering future
329 directions for prevention of pandemics and responses to them. There are many options for primary
330 prevention of COVID-19 and similar zoonotic infections. Reducing malnutrition can strengthen people’s
331 immune responses, and living wages, employment, and universal health care can make health services
332 affordable and available. Changing industrial food production methods is a critical element in preventing
333 spillovers and disease.[26,63]

334
335 The global response to the COVID-19 pandemic builds on historical experience with prior crises.
336 Collective efforts have led to profound advances. For example, the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist
337 Republics) Sanitation and Epidemiological Services developed five laboratories and sent health workers
338 throughout the Soviet Union to eradicate diphtheria, smallpox, malaria, and polio.[25] Also, according to
339 one study, “The HIV epidemic showed that biomedical advances alone are insufficient to sustainably
340 control a pandemic. Each country will have its own unique challenges in vaccine distribution.”[64] In

341 fact, LMICs have addressed issues of distribution within their countries in a number of ways. The
342 expansion of infrastructure and reporting under the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
343 (PEPFAR) in Africa demonstrated that poor countries can provide health care services to difficult-to-
344 reach populations with the complex treatment of HIV. Daily doses for years and lab monitoring are more
345 difficult than vaccination programs, but great success has occurred with HIV and with COVID
346 vaccinations. The structures have helped these countries pivot to COVID vaccinations, which have been
347 more limited by vaccine availability than internal outreach.[65] When the United Nations brought cholera
348 vaccines to Haiti after the devastation of the 2010 earthquake, the Ministry of Health and Paul Farmer’s
349 Partners in Health vaccinated more than 75% of the population in large sections of the country, with 91%
350 returning for the second dose.[66] National Geographic vividly reported on multiple countries’ outreach
351 with COVID-19 vaccines even in the face of complex storage issues. Health care workers were shown
352 transporting coolers in Kashmir in mountainous and remote areas, down the rivers of Peru, and in rural
353 Colombia among others. Even the United States had its challenges using dogsleds in Alaska: “This is not
354 the first time health care workers traveled far and wide to deliver vaccines but ‘[w]e’ve never had a
355 preventable pandemic before.”[67]

356

357 Opposing Arguments

358 Multinational efforts exist to distribute vaccine donations equitably: COVAX, a multilateral instrument
359 directed by Gavi (The Vaccine Alliance), WHO, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and
360 other global institutions, was proposed to create a mechanism to supply COVID-19 vaccines to all
361 countries equitably. However, the rollout has not met its stated objectives. COVAX has failed to meet
362 expectations, accounting for less than 5% of all vaccines administered globally and not meeting its own
363 goal of vaccinating 40% of Africa in 2021 because of supply chain issues.[68]

364

365 One of the main hindrances to the success of COVAX has been HICs entering into bilateral agreements
366 with pharmaceutical companies. The United States has entered into seven deals with six companies for
367 800 million doses, which are enough to vaccinate 140% of its population.[69] This process has put HICs
368 in front of the queue, leaving COVAX to wait to receive its share. Because of the outmaneuvering by
369 HICs, COVAX has had to make concessions to attract participation in the program. The first concession
370 was made to allow self-financing countries the ability to choose what vaccines they would receive. The
371 second concession allowed self-financing countries to receive enough vaccines for up to 50% of their
372 population, while the original agreement allowed for 20%. These concessions gave HICs privileges that
373 undermined COVAX’s goal of equitable distribution. The European Union, United Kingdom, and United

374 States received more doses of vaccines to prepare for the winter holidays than African countries received
375 in all of 2021.[38]

376
377 Nations need to prioritize vaccination for their own population: COVID-19 is not the first situation in
378 which countries have practiced “vaccine nationalism” and hoarded vaccines to guarantee that they will
379 have more than enough to vaccinate their own population. By paying in advance and putting in orders
380 early, HICs hinder manufacturers’ ability to supply globally. As prices increase and supply decreases,
381 economic pressures increase alongside death rates in LMICs.[70] Vaccine nationalism was in play for the
382 United States and India, among others. Covishield exports from the Serum Institute of India were stopped
383 in mid-April 2022 under pressure from the Indian government to use the vaccine at home; prior to that,
384 many doses had already been sold to HICs. The United States held up exports of raw materials, such as
385 liners for bioreactors and filters, because of its concern for its own vaccine supplies, which contributed to
386 Serum’s shortfall of vaccine.[71] Vaccine nationalism also increases risks in HICs as it allows the virus to
387 spread in other countries, providing an opportunity for the virus to mutate and for new variants to emerge.
388 At that point, new variants may already be circulating that are not well controlled, as was seen with
389 Novavax in South Africa.[72] Furthermore, vaccine hoarding in HICs has led to vaccine waste. More than
390 82 million doses have been wasted in the United States (more than 10% of all doses distributed in the
391 country).[73] Globally, in December 2021, more than 100 million doses intended for donation through
392 COVAX were wasted because they were donated too close to the expiration date.[74]

393
394 Low- and middle-income countries do not have the capacity to produce vaccines themselves: Opponents
395 of waiving IP rights to COVID-19 vaccines argue that infrastructure and technology capabilities in
396 LMICs are insufficient, which could result in compromised quality and safety of vaccine manufacturing
397 and distribution. However, high gross domestic product is not an accurate predictor of whether countries
398 are prepared for large-scale vaccine manufacturing.[75] Currently, there are 19 LMICs that have the
399 infrastructure and capability to produce mRNA COVID-19 vaccines on a significant scale. Furthermore,
400 even LMICs that do not yet have the infrastructure and technology capabilities to produce vaccines
401 autonomously will benefit from expanding vaccine technology access to LMICs that do already have the
402 means to produce vaccines on a large scale. If the number of LMICs that have access to vaccine
403 technology and infrastructure is increased, other LMICs would have the opportunity to learn from
404 successful LMIC models to inform their vaccine manufacturing and infrastructure moving forward.

405
406 In addition, it is likely that LMICs with manufacturing capacity will effectively export vaccines to other
407 LMICs that are not yet equipped with the necessary technology and production infrastructure. During the

408 COVID-19 pandemic, South Africa has pledged 2 million doses of the Johnson & Johnson vaccine to other
409 African countries, and India has exported COVID-19 vaccines to neighboring LMICs such as Nepal,
410 Bangladesh, and Myanmar.[76,77] There is further precedent for LMICs with medical production
411 capability sharing life-saving technology and medication with other LMICs: during the AIDS crisis, the
412 Thai government collaborated with Indian vaccine manufacturers and African governments to produce
413 and distribute antiretroviral drugs.[78] India is the world's largest vaccine manufacturer, producing 60%
414 of vaccines globally, enabling one of the fastest COVID-19 vaccine rollouts of any nation.[43] Also, the
415 dose production of mRNA vaccines is faster than that of cell-based vaccines, and the vaccines can be
416 produced in existing facilities more easily in some cases.[79] Continued support from WHO would ensure
417 consistency in vaccine quality and safety across all vaccine-producing countries.

418
419 For 19 LMICs, the barrier to producing and distributing vaccines is not a lack of capacity and
420 infrastructure to manufacture vaccines but rather the result of pharmaceutical companies preventing
421 access to vaccine technology in order to protect profit margins. Pharmaceutical companies seek to profit
422 from the work of LMICs with capacity for large-scale vaccine production, demonstrating that the decision
423 to prevent LMICs from producing vaccines is not based on material capacity. Pfizer has announced a
424 business deal with Eurofarma Laboratórios SA, a Brazilian biopharmaceutical company, to manufacture
425 COVID-19 vaccines for distribution within Latin America. Moderna plans to build its own mRNA
426 vaccine production site in South Africa while still denying the South Africa WHO mRNA hub access to
427 vaccine technology, preventing South Africa from producing vaccines autonomously and ultimately
428 ensuring large profits for Moderna.[80] LMICs that currently do not have the capacity for vaccine
429 production are still affected by these profit-driven decisions on the part of pharmaceutical companies. As
430 demonstrated by Moderna and Pfizer in South Africa and Latin America, leading pharmaceutical
431 companies have the means to both promote autonomous infrastructure for vaccine production and share
432 vaccine technology with LMICs that currently do not have capacity, but they have chosen not to do so in
433 the interest of protecting profits. Furthermore, historic technology hoarding on the part of pharmaceutical
434 companies and HICs may be a disincentive for LMICs to prioritize developing large-scale vaccine
435 production infrastructure.

436
437 There is meaningful precedent for medical expertise being adapted efficiently and effectively in LMICs.
438 The Medical Education Partnership Initiative (MEPI) is another example of how rapidly expertise can be
439 learned and adapted. MEPI was established to support medical education, enhance research capabilities,
440 and ensure sustainability in sub-Saharan Africa from 2010 to 2015. More than \$130 million went to
441 medical schools in 12 different countries. MEPI monitoring and evaluation was dynamic and allowed to

442 change according to need. Because there was local control, the pool of potential partners was larger than
443 when outside funders were the only ones involved. More than 1,000 manuscripts were submitted, along
444 with 552 applications for grants and fellowships. Of these applications, 34% (187) were successful. MEPI
445 fellows have mentored 866 students and postgraduates.[81]

446
447 People in low- and middle-income countries will not take available vaccines: Opponents of equitable
448 global distribution of COVID-19 vaccines argue that if provided the chance to become vaccinated,
449 populations from LMICs would simply refuse the vaccine. This is not supported by evidence: COVID-19
450 vaccine acceptance rates are generally higher in LMICs than in HICs. Studies conducted in 2020 revealed
451 that average acceptance rates across 24 LMICs in Asia, Africa, and South America were significantly
452 higher (80%) than in the United States (65%) and across seven HICs in Europe (74%).[82]

453
454 Studies assessing the data more closely have shown that some countries in sub-Saharan Africa such as
455 Ethiopia, Nigeria, Uganda, and Malawi have universal acceptance rates of up to 98%, 86%, 85%, and
456 82%, respectively.[53] Data from Latin America and the Caribbean show a vaccine intention rate of 78%,
457 and a study focusing on Southeast Asia revealed that 77% to 80% of respondents would take the
458 vaccine.[83,84] In another study in South Asia, the percentages of respondents willing to be vaccinated
459 against COVID-19 were 65%, 66%, 72%, and 74% in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Nepal,
460 respectively.[85] Rather than asking whether people from LMICs would get vaccinated, the question is
461 whether they will receive the opportunity. Racism, colonialism, and oppression are the driving forces
462 behind today's vaccine inequities.[86]

463
464 As of fall 2021, only 2% of low-income countries (LICs) had received one dose of the COVID-19
465 vaccine, in comparison with 30% of low- to middle-income countries, 54% of upper-middle-income
466 countries, and 65% of high-income countries; in order to achieve a global vaccination rate of 70% by
467 2022 as set by WHO, LICs would have had to significantly increase their daily COVID-19 vaccination
468 rates by as much as 24-fold.[87,88] Despite these goals and the increased need to prioritize vaccinations
469 for high-risk groups, as of June 2022 LICs were able to provide primary series vaccinations for only 28%
470 and 37% of their older adult and health care worker populations, respectively.[88,89] While shocking, this
471 is not the first time in history when low-resource areas such as Africa were deprived of life-saving
472 resources; during the HIV epidemic, some countries were unable to access antiretroviral therapy.[90]

473
474 Countries receiving PEPFAR funding are meaningful examples of how LMICs have leveraged existing
475 public health infrastructure to increase access to COVID-19 vaccines and prevention resources. As a

476 result of expanded PEPFAR funding, Zambia was able to administer nearly 2 million COVID-19 vaccines
477 as of January 2022 and engage 500 health facilities across the country in supporting COVID-19
478 vaccination efforts. Similarly, Eswatini has been able to expand vaccination efforts, leverage existing HIV
479 treatment infrastructure, and collaborate with community organizations to increase COVID-19
480 vaccinations across the country, and South Africa has used the funds to support existing efforts of
481 community health workers and increase resources for health staff (e.g., personal protective equipment,
482 medical equipment, and transportation for medical staff).[91] In addition, COVID-19-responsive
483 adaptations to HIV treatment resources in countries with PEPFAR funding created more opportunities to
484 expand public health messaging about COVID-19, contact tracing, and COVID-19 screenings that are
485 uniquely effective given the preexisting relationships between community members and local community
486 health organizations that often work in collaboration.[92] Health care workers in LMICs also adapted
487 existing infrastructure of PEPFAR-funded public health services to mitigate interruptions in maternal
488 health care and continue offering tuberculosis screening services, both of which were negatively affected
489 by the spread of COVID-19.[93] The effectiveness of expanded support in countries currently receiving
490 PEPFAR funding shows that there are numerous examples of LMICs with existing public health
491 infrastructure that, when supported through multinational economic cooperation, is successful in
492 mitigating the effects of pandemics. Furthermore, as noted above, global public health crises are not new
493 phenomena, and as such there are existing infrastructures in place that, with continued economic
494 investment and solidarity from HICs, have the capacity to increase access to health care services and
495 vaccines and have already been strategically adapted by LMICs to meet national health care needs.

496

497 In a world where many countries are excluded from the vaccine marketplace and there are enough
498 vaccines available to vaccinate countries up to eight times over, there is no denying that vaccine
499 apartheid, racism, colonialism, and oppression are the driving forces behind the vaccine inequities that
500 exist today.[90,94] As the pandemic progresses, new strains of the virus driven by viral evolution will
501 continue to manifest and worsen, with a high likelihood of increased transmissibility and immune escape
502 and a risk of increased virulence. Without equitable vaccine distribution, we will continue to experience
503 significant COVID-19 transmission, hospitalizations, and deaths.[89]

504

505 Patents are a necessary reward to encourage pharmaceutical innovation: A purported benefit of strong
506 patent protections is a greater incentive for innovation resulting in more novel medications. However,
507 stronger IP protection has been associated with higher drug costs, less access to medications, and a
508 proliferation of slightly modified products of little or no additional therapeutic value created entirely to
509 extend monopoly prices protected by patents.[38] Assessments of the actual investment by

510 pharmaceutical companies in pioneering R&D to develop truly innovative drugs estimate that up to 80%
511 of the industry's R&D spending goes toward me-too drugs, which are replicas of previously created drugs
512 and do not add any clinical value to medical treatment. Furthermore, it is estimated that in the United
513 States about two thirds of funding for R&D of pharmaceutical products comes from public sources, and
514 all of the 210 new drugs approved by the FDA between 2006 and 2016 received funding from the
515 National Institutes of Health.[54] COVID-19 vaccines are no exception: the U.S. government is estimated
516 to have spent between \$18 billion and \$23 billion on the development of COVID-19 vaccines, including
517 hundreds of millions of dollars of investments in the mRNA platform, more than \$900 million in support
518 of nonclinical studies and research to accelerate movement of candidate vaccines into clinical trials, \$2.7
519 billion in funding to pharmaceutical companies to cover expenses related to human trials, about \$3 billion
520 in manufacturing investments, and decreases of market risk through advance purchase contracts for a
521 value of at least \$12 billion.[95]

522

523 Development of a global strategy for patent relations is blocked by complex, obstructive patent policies
524 across countries that cannot be untangled: The current asymmetry of power between HICs and LMICs is
525 the most important consideration and barrier to progress. A TRIPS waiver would have opened the door
526 for much wider vaccine production and access, and such a waiver was requested by many LMICs but
527 blocked by Germany and Switzerland and not demanded by other HICs.[96]

528

529 However, there have been efforts at global solutions to patent protections. In response to the HIV/AIDS
530 epidemic, the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) was founded in 2010, and private pharmaceutical companies
531 voluntarily agreed that LMICs could access licensed essential medicines.[97] LMICs thus can identify
532 existing patents on needed medications and advocate for lower rates or generic production. This library of
533 information includes medications for HIV, hepatitis C, and tuberculosis and newly added COVID-19
534 data. It forms a basis for an expanded data set of patents in a centralized location. Also, when patents have
535 been included in the MPP, there has been a large increase in licensing of life-saving medications and an
536 increase in generic drug supplies.[98,99] In 2021, Merck and Pfizer allowed the manufacture of
537 molnupiravir and Paxlovid for treatment of COVID-19.[100] The agreement with Merck involved 27
538 generic companies spanning 11 countries (Bangladesh, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya,
539 Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, and Vietnam). The more recently created WHO COVID-19
540 Technology Access Pool offers additional paths to development. These examples illustrate the potential
541 for voluntary collaboration and decreases in the current power asymmetry.

542

543 As the ability to expand pharmaceutical production evolves in LMICs and regional cooperatives, TRIPS
544 waivers will offer even more opportunities. Even without waivers, however, the improved capacity to
545 develop vaccines and therapeutics locally will have benefits in responding to global pandemics and more
546 local epidemics. Populations may be even more receptive to locally developed vaccines than imports
547 (often delayed and near expiration). Continued investments in LMICs' infrastructure and research by
548 HICs can advance global health.[96]

549
550 U.S. government officials are doing everything they can to help vaccinate the world: In 2021, the U.S.
551 government stated its commitment to bolstering vaccine production and contributing to global vaccine
552 efforts through initiatives such as COVAX.[101] The U.S. executive branch verbally supported waiving
553 patents for COVID-19 vaccines (TRIPS) but has yet to follow through. Vaccine apartheid exists, in large
554 part, because of American pharmaceutical companies' corporate greed and the lack of accountability for
555 the U.S. government and its role in the unequal distribution and manufacturing of COVID-19 vaccines.
556 The Defense Procurement Act can still be used to push Moderna mRNA vaccine production worldwide
557 because it was developed with U.S. taxpayer dollars.[55]

558
559 Action Steps

560 The COVID-19 pandemic continues to devastate communities at local, national, and global levels, both in
561 terms of morbidity and mortality from the disease and negative economic effects. Ensuring timely and
562 equitable access to medical products for the prevention and treatment of COVID-19 is vital to limiting
563 further impact of the pandemic. COVID-19 is not a problem that individual countries can solve alone;
564 rather, it is the responsibility of countries with access to vaccines to show global solidarity and share life-
565 saving information and technology. This policy statement demonstrates APHA's strong support for global
566 vaccine development efforts and rapid dissemination of the tools needed for countries to develop,
567 manufacture, and deliver effective vaccines. Therefore, APHA:

- 568 • Calls on the U.S. president and the U.S. trade representative to actively work with international
569 leaders to negotiate a waiver for patent enforcement under the TRIPS Agreement.
- 570 • Calls on WHO and HIC governments to commit additional financial and other resources to
571 support broader vaccine production.
- 572 • Calls on pharmaceutical companies to voluntarily pledge nonenforcement of IP rights and to
573 share the IP and technology needed to produce treatments and vaccines.
- 574 • Calls on WHO, HIC governments, and LMIC governments to ensure that, once vaccines are
575 available in LMICs, they are administered for free and that other barriers to individuals receiving
576 vaccines are reduced to the extent possible.

- 577 • Calls on the U.S. president, the director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and
578 Congress to repeal non-evidence-based immigration and asylum policies implemented under the
579 auspices of COVID-19 precautions.
- 580 • Calls on international government leaders to commit financial and other resources to build public
581 health and clinical infrastructure to shore up near- and long-term preparedness.
- 582 • Calls on U.S. government leaders and international government leaders to provide financial
583 assistance, food and water assistance, and plentiful home testing kits to low-income workers and
584 those who work in the informal economy in order to ameliorate the effects of the pandemic.
- 585 • Calls on the broader public health community, including but not limited to local health
586 departments, academic centers, nongovernmental organizations, nonprofit organizations, and
587 local grassroots community groups, to support education efforts intended to address
588 misinformation and potential vaccine reluctance.
- 589 • Calls on public health experts to educate the public and Congress about the ecological and food
590 production causes of COVID-19 and to oppose factory farming and deforestation.

591

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