

1 **Ensuring Equitable Access to Affordable Prescription Medications**

2

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6 Abstract

7 Prescription drug prices in the United States are higher than in any other industrialized nation in the world,  
8 mainly owing to the increased use of new, more expensive drugs and the steady price rise of brand-name  
9 prescription drugs. High prices and inadequate insurance make medicines unattainable for many patients in  
10 this country. Patents and market exclusivities and collusion agreements with the pharmaceutical industry  
11 remain the main barriers to competition in the generic and biosimilar market. Universal access to effective,  
12 safe, and affordable medications requires a comprehensive national drug formulary system along with drug  
13 pricing and reimbursement systems. Evidence-based national drug formularies provide an opportunity to  
14 address inconsistent and inequitable decision making with regard to prescription drug coverage, prescribing  
15 practices, and reimbursement for cost-effective drugs of therapeutic value. In addition, formularies have the  
16 potential to reduce medication errors and are an effective tool to foster rational use of drugs. However,  
17 current prescription drug coverage in formularies is driven by undisclosed rebates and discounts. The U.S.  
18 reimbursement system often reimburses the use of expensive new pharmaceutical products regardless of  
19 their comparative safety and effectiveness. Access to prescription drugs should be driven by patients' health  
20 care needs, not their financial capabilities. To ensure equal access to affordable prescription medicines, this  
21 policy statement takes a public health perspective addressing four key dimensions of the pharmaceutical  
22 sector: increasing drug market competition, enhancing clinical research and drug development centered on  
23 patients and population health outcome improvements, streamlining public and private drug pricing and  
24 reimbursement systems, and expanding affordable drug insurance to all Americans.

25

26 Relationship to Existing APHA Policy Statements

- 27 ● APHA Statement 20006: Making Medicines Affordable: the Price Factor
- 28 ● APHA Statement 20031: Supporting Legislation for Independent Post-Marketing (Phase IV)  
29 Comparative Evaluation of Pharmaceuticals
- 30 ● APHA Statement 20219: Adopting a Single-Payer Health System
- 31 ● APHA Statement 201512: Ensuring That Trade Agreements Promote Public Health
- 32 ● APHA Statement 9615: Supporting National Standards of Accountability for Access and Quality in  
33 Managed Health Care

- 34 ● APHA Statement 202112: Lessons from the COVID 19 Pandemic: The Importance of Universal  
35 Health Care in Addressing Health Care Inequities
- 36 ● APHA Statement 20153: Universal Access to Contraception
- 37 ● APHA Statement 200613: Regulating Drugs for Effectiveness and Safety: A Public Health  
38 Perspective

39

#### 40 Problem Statement

41 Access to health care is a basic human right and a well-established public health principle.[1] Critical to the  
42 right to health care is people’s timely access to safe, effective, and affordable prescription drugs reflecting  
43 high medical standards of care. In the United States, access to prescription drugs is in the context of a for-  
44 profit pharmaceutical system that often leads to enormous financial burdens for health care systems, health  
45 care providers, and, ultimately, consumers. Thus, health care is inextricably linked to access to affordable  
46 prescription drugs, and drug affordability remains a major public health challenge in this country. The  
47 combination of high prices and inadequate insurance places drugs out of reach for many patients.

48

49 In the past four decades, drug prices have increased faster than inflation and economic growth. Drug prices  
50 in the United States are higher than in any other developed nation’s economy. U.S. outpatient prescription  
51 drug spending increased from \$12.0 billion in 1980 to \$348.4 billion in 2020. Outpatient prescription drug  
52 spending increased faster than all other health care spending, as well as the Consumer Price Index for all  
53 items excluding health care and the gross domestic product.[2,3] Prescription drug expenditures per capita  
54 increased from \$140 in 1980 to \$1,073 in 2018[4] and \$1,631 in 2020.[5] In 2018, outpatient prescription  
55 drug spending averaged \$2,700 per Medicare Part D enrollee and \$530 per Medicaid enrollee. Overall,  
56 prescription drug spending has increased by 20% in the United States, both as total expenditures and as a  
57 percentage of total health care expenditures, over the past 10 years.[6] This has been driven by the increase  
58 in the use of new, costlier pharmaceuticals approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the  
59 steady increase in prices of brand-name prescription drugs.[4]

60

61 After adjustment for differences in purchasing power, outpatient prescription drug spending among  
62 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries averaged \$564 per person in 2017, with  
63 spending highest in the United States (\$1,220), Switzerland (\$963), and Japan (\$838).[7] While high  
64 prescription drug prices are an endemic problem in health care systems across the world,[8] prices are 2.5  
65 times higher in the United States than in any other developed economy.[9] The average price, after discounts  
66 and rebates, of brand-name prescription drugs increased steadily between 2009 and 2018, from \$149 to \$353  
67 in Medicare Part D and from \$147 to \$218 in Medicaid.[4] Conversely, the average price for generic drugs in

68 Medicare Part D and Medicaid fell over that period.[4] The average price of a generic prescription drug fell  
69 from \$22 to \$17 in Medicare Part D and from \$27 to \$23 in Medicaid from 2009 to 2018. Uninsured and  
70 underinsured patients are unable to pay the high out-of-pocket costs of prescription drugs. Increasing  
71 prescription drug prices are straining insurers and public health insurance program budgets and leading to  
72 increased patient copayments and reduced drug coverage.[10]

73  
74 High prescription drug prices are not a new problem. A report from the Senate Judiciary Antitrust and  
75 Monopoly Subcommittee published in 1961 showed that prescription drug prices were unreasonable in  
76 relation to industry costs and prices in other countries.[11] Equally relevant to the current situation, the  
77 subcommittee’s report revealed that high prescription drug prices were related to a lack of market  
78 competition, shortcomings of the patent system, prescription drug marketing, direct-to-consumer advertising,  
79 and drug pricing mechanisms.

80  
81 Despite overwhelming evidence that high prices make prescription drugs unaffordable for a growing number  
82 of Americans, in the past four decades the U.S. Congress has increased patent and exclusivity regulations for  
83 pharmaceuticals[12] while postponing legislation aimed at containing prescription drug prices.

84  
85 Evidence-Based Strategies to Address the Problem

86 Several proposals to address increasing prescription drug prices have been put forward.[13–17] This policy  
87 statement takes a public health perspective and aims to ensure equitable access to affordable prescription  
88 drugs by addressing four key dimensions of the pharmaceutical sector: drug market competition, clinical  
89 research and drug development centered on patients and population health outcome improvements, public  
90 and private drug pricing and reimbursement systems, and affordable drug insurance for all Americans.

91  
92 Call to increase drug market competition: Adequate drug safety, efficacy, and price information is a  
93 necessary condition for a competitive prescription drug market. Generic and biosimilar competition (to the  
94 extent competition exists) significantly reduce prices of prescription drugs and biologics, making  
95 pharmaceutical products more affordable. However, patents and market exclusivities and pharmaceutical  
96 industry collusive agreements remain the main barriers to generic and biosimilar market competition.

97  
98 During the past 40 years, the U.S. Congress has enacted regulations that have proven to favor a profitable  
99 pharmaceutical industry, including regulations extending the patent and market exclusivities of prescription  
100 drugs. Examples of such regulations are the Orphan Drug Act of 1983 (orphan exclusivity), the Drug Price  
101 Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (Waxman-Hatch Act) of 1984 (market exclusivity and patent

102 extension), the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (extending the Waxman-Hatch  
103 Act provision to antibiotics), the Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 (market exclusivity for biologics), and  
104 the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA) of 2012 (adding market exclusivity  
105 for anti-infective drugs).[18] International trade agreements, particularly the World Trade Organization's  
106 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, implemented in 1995, set global  
107 minimum pharmaceutical patents and exclusivities that generated substantial gains for the pharmaceutical  
108 industry in developed economies and reduced the affordability of and accessibility to pharmaceuticals in less  
109 developed economies.[19]

110

111 In addition, despite the fact that many pharmaceutical company patent infringement claims are deemed  
112 invalid in litigation processes, ongoing appeals effectively delay market competition.[20] Between  
113 September 24, 1984, and December 31, 2001, generic companies filed 1,340 paragraph IV certifications  
114 before the FDA, claiming that patents listed by brand pharmaceutical companies were invalid or had not  
115 been infringed.[21] According to the Federal Trade Commission, pharmaceutical companies effectively  
116 blocked generic competition by offering patent settlements to pay generic companies not to market lower-  
117 cost generic drug therapeutic alternatives (pay for delay).[22,23]

118

119 Safety, efficacy, and price information remain the cornerstone of a competitive pharmaceutical market, and it  
120 is essential to maximize the benefits and minimize the harms of prescription drugs. The FDA has been the  
121 primary source of reliable knowledge on prescription drug efficacy prior to approval, labeling, and  
122 postmarketing monitoring for safety. Federal regulations enacted since the early 1990s, including the  
123 Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 (PDUFA), the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (part  
124 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010), and FDASIA, have effectively expedited the  
125 drug development process and reduced FDA regulatory review time, leading to a significant increase in the  
126 number of prescription drugs approved and the use of expedited approval pathways to bring more  
127 prescription drugs to the U.S. market faster.[24] Whether these new drugs represent any added value for  
128 patients or address unmet medical needs (defined by the FDA as conditions whose treatment or diagnosis is  
129 not addressed adequately by available therapy) is unknown.[18]

130

131 Unmet medical need is a relatively easily met criterion for many noncurative treatments, suggesting an ever-  
132 widening window for new drugs whose potential benefits over existing products may not be robustly  
133 established. For example, FDASIA amended the accelerated approval of new drugs for serious or life-  
134 threatening diseases and removed the requirement for evidence of added therapeutic benefit. Also, the Cures  
135 Act (2016) established the limited population antimicrobial drug regulatory pathway that reduced the

136 requirements for approval of new antimicrobials. More recently, the Cures 2.0 Act (H.R. 6000) included  
137 several economic incentives for the development of new antibiotics such as federal reimbursement for newly  
138 developed antibiotics irrespective of demonstration of improved patient outcomes relative to already-  
139 marketed alternatives.[25]

140  
141 Moreover, PDUFA (1992) authorized the FDA to collect fees from drug sponsor companies to enable the  
142 agency to hire staff to reduce the regulatory review time for drug approval. PDUFA raises conflict of interest  
143 and other ethical concerns about the FDA receiving financial support from the companies it regulates.[26]

144  
145 While the U.S. regulation requires pharmaceutical companies to provide evidence of new drug benefits  
146 outweighing risks at the time of approval, it does not require proof of comparative safety and efficacy. As a  
147 result, patients, clinicians, and health care payers lack the information on long-term effectiveness and safety  
148 of medicines necessary for comprehensive, evidence-based clinical and population-based decision making.

149  
150 Call to enhance drug development by featuring patient-centered and population-based health outcomes:  
151 Clinical drug trials are seldom designed to assess added benefits for patients with unmet medical needs.[27]  
152 Therefore, clinical evidence of improved outcomes in patient populations lacking therapeutic alternatives is  
153 often not available during the FDA regulatory review for determination of approval. Postmarketing studies  
154 required by the FDA at approval are often delayed and provide limited evidence of added value. Clinical  
155 trials frequently evaluate surrogate outcomes rather than direct measures of patient quality of life,  
156 functioning, or survival,[28] increasing the uncertainty about whether new drugs address health outcomes.  
157 Pharmaceutical companies are not required to disclose proprietary data derived from clinical trials and  
158 postmarketing studies, further reducing the information available for clinical and population-based decision  
159 making. The unknown clinical value of new drugs is often accompanied by expensive drug promotion and  
160 advertising campaigns. Until 1985, the pharmaceutical industry abided by a voluntary agreement to restrict  
161 prescription drug promotion to medical professionals. Rescinding this agreement, a blitz of multimedia  
162 marketing activities followed and began to target clinicians and patients through direct-to-consumer  
163 advertising strategies.[29]

164  
165 In a drug development world with public benefit at its core, research and development (R&D) would be  
166 geared toward maximizing population health. While many new drugs are approved by the FDA each year,  
167 only a minority represent advances in patient and population health outcomes.[30] By contrast,  
168 pharmaceutical R&D often focuses on marginal changes to differentiate similar drugs (“me too” products or  
169 formulation changes), anticipating higher potential return on investment rather than focusing on new

170 scientific paradigms aimed at reducing morbidity and mortality. Furthermore, R&D has limited public sector  
171 oversight and input from patients and health care professionals.

172  
173 Call to streamline public and private drug pricing and reimbursement systems: Universal access to  
174 prescription drug coverage requires the establishment of a national formulary and a pricing and  
175 reimbursement system that ensure that drugs are affordable for patients and the society at large. Currently,  
176 each managed care organization, drug plan, and health care provider in the United States has its own drug  
177 formulary with different drugs covered and different copayment schemes. Large organizations have several  
178 formularies depending on the premium and out-of-pocket costs paid by their members. Drug selection for  
179 inclusion in drug formularies is driven by rebates and discounts that insurers, pharmaceutical benefit  
180 managers, and health plans negotiate with drug companies behind closed doors. By contrast, the Department  
181 of Veterans Affairs (VA) national drug formulary shifts prescribing practices toward preferred formulary  
182 drugs, achieving higher front-end discounts from drug manufacturers and reducing drug expenditures  
183 without compromising patient outcomes.[31] The VA national formulary approach applied to Medicare  
184 would result in substantial reductions in unnecessary drug spending for Medicare enrollees and taxpayers at  
185 large.[32]

186  
187 Another example is the Department of Defense (DoD) uniform drug formulary (TRICARE formulary)  
188 implemented in 2005. Implementation of the DoD drug formulary was associated with an estimated \$986  
189 million in cost avoidance in fiscal year 2007, representing approximately a 13% reduction in drug  
190 expenditures.[33] TRICARE has an annual \$7.3 billion pharmacy spend.[34] Harmonizing drug formularies  
191 across health systems would reduce the amounts and types of medications on hand and increase drug  
192 discounts and buying power through bulk purchasing.[35,36] In 2008, the DoD began collecting discounts  
193 for drugs dispensed through TRICARE retail network pharmacies. These pricing discounts represent  
194 significant savings to the DoD. The Military Health System estimated an \$825 million savings in retail  
195 pharmacy refunds on most brand-name retail drugs in fiscal year 2020.[34] As of December 2020, DoD  
196 savings derived from drug pricing discounts totaled approximately \$14.3 billion. Further savings can be  
197 achieved through national drug formularies by decreasing the cost associated with medication inventory and  
198 waste.[37]

199  
200 The Elijah E. Cummings Lower Drug Costs Now Act (2019) requires the Department of Health and Human  
201 Services to negotiate maximum prices for certain drugs including insulin products, single-source brand-name  
202 drugs that do not have generic competition and that account for the greatest national or Medicare prescription  
203 drug benefit and Medicare Advantage spending. It also requires negotiating prices for other single-source

204 brand-name drugs and newly approved single-source brand-name drugs that meet or exceed a specified price  
205 threshold. The negotiated prices must be offered under Medicare and Medicare Advantage and may also be  
206 offered under private health insurance unless the insurer opts out.[38]

207 Legislative and regulatory initiatives for reforming drug pricing and regulation have been effectively  
208 counteracted by large campaign donors and lobbyists in the pharmaceutical industry. A recent study showed  
209 that, among all industries, the pharmaceutical and health care industry ranked first in terms of federal-level  
210 lobbying expenditures.[39]

211  
212 The U.S. reimbursement system often reimburses for the use of costly new pharmaceutical products  
213 irrespective of their comparative safety and effectiveness. Drug manufacturers' marketing and advertising  
214 strategies focus on differentiating drugs that are clinically equivalent to low-cost generic alternatives.  
215 Unnecessary use of pharmaceutical products does not improve patient outcomes and diverts scarce resources  
216 from other health care needs. By contrast, most developed economies, including Australia, Canada, France,  
217 Germany, and the United Kingdom, use health technology assessments (HTAs) more comprehensively than  
218 the United States to inform their public health care system formulary additions, pricing, and reimbursement  
219 of new drug decisions.[40,41] HTAs involve the comparative effectiveness and economic evaluations of new  
220 drugs. The United States does not have a centralized process for HTAs. Even the several federal public  
221 insurance programs have different processes for formulary decision making and drug reimbursement. Drug  
222 manufacturer sponsors set different prices for the same drug for different public and private payers, and final  
223 drug prices, discounts, and rebates paid by different programs are confidential.

224  
225 Call to expand affordable drug insurance to all Americans: Access to prescription drugs should be  
226 determined by patients' medical needs as opposed to their financial means. In the United States, 27.4 million  
227 people were uninsured in 2020.[42] About 13% of U.S. residents do not have any form of health insurance to  
228 pay for prescription medications, and even those who have coverage are often unable to afford drug  
229 copayments and other cost-sharing mechanisms. One in four adults in the United States reports difficulty  
230 affording drug out-of-pocket costs. The impact of an inequitable prescription drug delivery system is most  
231 poignant when reviewing cost-related nonadherence to medications. Cost-related medication nonadherence  
232 in the United States is two to four times higher than in other developed countries.[43] Thirty percent of  
233 adults report not taking their medicines as prescribed in the past year because of drug costs, including 16%  
234 who report not filling a prescription and 13% who cut their pills in half or skip a dose of a prescribed  
235 medicine.[44]

236

237 The adverse impact of lacking comprehensive insurance has also been documented in the literature. While  
238 the poor and the elderly may have access to prescription medications through public programs (Medicaid and  
239 Medicare, respectively), adults in the 19–45-year-old group, even if they are partially insured, are often most  
240 at risk due to moderate incomes, copayments, and deductible requirements.[45] Adults 19–64 years of age  
241 are three times less likely to fill a prescription if they are underinsured.[45] Patients with chronic conditions  
242 are disproportionately affected. Chronic illness without regular access to medications is one key dimension in  
243 need of repair to ensure equitable medication access in the United States. According to one study, a cost  
244 sharing of \$10.40 per prescription drug led to a 22.2% drop in medication use and a 32.7% increase in  
245 monthly mortality.[46] Thus, the income and insurance status of individuals in this country greatly affects  
246 their sense of security in terms of accessing regular health care and prescription medications.

247  
248 Viewing society through the lens of economic disparities raises the importance of the interaction of race with  
249 economic status.[47] A for-profit health care delivery system has a deep impact on marginalized low-income  
250 groups such as people of color, incarcerated individuals, and undocumented immigrants. Institutional racism  
251 in health care has been identified as inaction in the face of need.[48] Nowhere is that need more apparent  
252 than in the health service research literature identifying unmet health needs among people of color, leading  
253 to great disparities in health outcomes.[49]

254  
255 Incarcerated individuals, particularly adult men of color, generally face both economic and social challenges.  
256 Adults account for 99% of jail inmates, 86% of them are males, and more than half are people of color.[50]  
257 Incarcerated people are not eligible to purchase private health insurance. In addition, adults in the criminal  
258 justice system largely have low incomes and are uninsured, which leads to the need for Medicaid coverage.  
259 However, Medicaid has traditionally played a very limited role in providing health insurance coverage, and  
260 few inmates are covered by Medicaid. With the Medicaid coverage expansions, there may be opportunities  
261 to provide health coverage for people in the criminal justice system, particularly those faced with financial  
262 difficulties.

263  
264 Public health concern for the undocumented population is notable in the state of California, where the  
265 undocumented population is sizable (10.6 million).[51] The uninsured rate is 46% among undocumented  
266 Californians, as compared with 10% among U.S.-born Californians. Laudable efforts have been made to  
267 cover children, youth, and pregnant women. However, adults are restricted to emergency room access or to  
268 coverage for limited chronic conditions. Ongoing efforts to cover the undocumented population have been  
269 fueled by the emergence of COVID-19 and its variants.

270



271 In general, cost sharing for brand-name drugs and specialty drugs is set at a percentage of the retail drug  
272 price.[52] Those who lack health insurance, those whose plan does not include coverage for prescription  
273 drugs, and those who have not met their insurance plan’s annual deductible have to pay the full drug price.  
274 The scant insurance coverage and the increasing cost sharing, along with reduced treatment adherence, result  
275 in a worsening of health outcomes. This dilemma is particularly troublesome for people with limited  
276 incomes, those with employer-based insurance and job insecurity, and the incarcerated and undocumented  
277 population.

278  
279 **Opposing Arguments/Evidence**

280 Patent extensions and market exclusivities are necessary to incentivize pharmaceutical innovation and to  
281 reward private enterprise: Pharmaceutical companies argue that they should be rewarded with more patent  
282 extensions and market exclusivities to incentivize drug innovation and to recover drug research and  
283 development investments because developing a new drug is a costly and uncertain process and less than 12%  
284 of drugs entering clinical trials are approved by the FDA.[53] According to PhRMA, the estimated average  
285 R&D cost per new drug, including products that never entered the market, reached \$2.6 billion in the early  
286 2010s.[54]

287  
288 Several laws and regulations include provisions that increased the patent and market exclusivity periods for  
289 pharmaceutical products. The Orphan Drug Act provided 7-year market exclusivity to drugs with orphan  
290 designation. The Waxman-Hatch Act authorized 5 years of market exclusivity for new drugs and 3 years of  
291 market exclusivity for drugs containing active ingredients already approved for marketing in the United  
292 States. The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act established a 6-month exclusivity period as a  
293 reward for drug manufacturers that conduct FDA-approved pediatric research. The ACA granted brand-name  
294 biologics 12 years of market exclusivity. Also, FDASIA added 5 years of market exclusivity for certain anti-  
295 infective drugs. During the 1-year provisional patent term, the 20-year patent statutory term, patent  
296 extensions, and market exclusivity periods, pharmaceuticals do not face generic competition. Hence,  
297 pharmaceutical companies set prices of new drugs to maximize profits.[55,56]

298  
299 Patent and market exclusivities for finite periods reward pharmaceutical companies. Companies often  
300 strategically leverage the patent and drug approval systems to prolong their monopolies irrespective of the  
301 clinical significance of new approved drugs.[57] Further extending patents and market exclusivities has been  
302 associated with higher drug prices, prolonged monopolies,[58] and a flourish of “me too” drugs of little or no  
303 therapeutic value brought to the market to lengthen monopoly prices.[57] Budget constraints are necessary to

304 better align pharmaceutical company incentives with patients' ability to pay for pharmaceuticals in the  
305 context of public health-oriented drug development.

306  
307 Higher prices and reimbursement rates are necessary to incentivize the development of new medicines to  
308 address patient needs: Pharmaceutical companies argue that higher prices and reimbursement are necessary  
309 to reward innovation and that drug pricing regulations would affect the profits of existing drugs and expected  
310 returns on investment for future drugs, leading to fewer new drugs in the U.S. market.[59]

311  
312 The profitability of the U.S. drug industry is the subject of ongoing debate and complex quantitative analyses  
313 resulting in confusion and biased interpretation depending on methodology, data sources, underlying  
314 assumptions, and funding sources. Ledley et al. reported on a comparison of 2000–2018 proprietary data  
315 between drug companies and S&P 500 companies showing net income margins of 13.8% and 7.7%,  
316 respectively.[60] DeAngelis, former editor of JAMA, raised a challenging question: what is a fair and  
317 legitimate profit for a drug?[61] Reflecting on average 18% profit margins, with more than 20% among the  
318 top five large companies, DeAngelis noted several conditions contributing to these exorbitant profits. For  
319 example, in contrast to all other developed countries other than New Zealand, the drug industry in the United  
320 States can set its own drug prices independent of government authority. Not surprisingly, drugs such as  
321 Solvadi, the hepatitis C drug, cost \$1,000 per pill.[62]

322  
323 Many in the public sector see the greater return on revenue of the U.S. drug industry as reflecting excessive  
324 profits. However, industry proponents justify such profits, claiming costly R&D. The cost of bringing a new  
325 drug to market has yielded estimates as high as \$2.6 billion. Such exorbitant estimates have fueled outcries  
326 in the press.[63] An independent assessment of the cost of bringing a prescription drug to market revealed  
327 that the median capitalized R&D was \$985.3 million per new drug entity, still a substantial figure[64] and  
328 subject to debate in terms of the contribution of ancillary costs (e.g., marketing, lobbying, payments to  
329 prescribers). As a result, marketing and administration can contribute more than twice the cost of R&D to the  
330 total cost of bringing a drug to market.[65]

331  
332 In 2018, large pharmaceutical companies accounted for most pharmaceutical revenues, whereas small drug  
333 companies accounted for more than 70% of the total pharmaceutical R&D pipeline.[66] Furthermore, major  
334 innovative drugs have been discovered in public universities (e.g., enzalutamide) funded through grants from  
335 the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and patent rights have been purchased after drug discovery by  
336 private companies, generating enormous revenues for drug companies. The NIH allocates more than \$40  
337 billion each year to fund biomedical research.[67] Hence, U.S. taxpayers end up paying twice for

338 pharmaceutical products.[67] Initially, taxpayers pay for pharmaceuticals discovered and developed with  
339 NIH funding and orphan drug designations through grants and tax credits. Taxpayers pay again for  
340 pharmaceuticals included in public health care programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.

341  
342 Medicines discovered with taxpayers' money should be affordable to all Americans.[57] Some  
343 pharmaceutical products, including COVID-19 vaccines, were funded by the government and, once  
344 discovered, were purchased by public health programs at high prices. For example, the oral antiviral drug  
345 that reduces the severity of COVID-19 (molnupiravir) is sold at many times the manufacturing cost, resulting  
346 in calls for congressional action.

347  
348 Action Steps

349 To this end, APHA urges the U.S. Congress to:

- 350 1. Enact policies to reduce barriers to market entry to increase market competition, bringing the patent  
351 and market exclusivity regulation of pharmaceuticals in line with U.S. intellectual property  
352 regulations, and end “pay-for-delay” settlements and other agreements that block generic  
353 competition in the pharmaceutical industry.
- 354 2. Enhance standards of pharmaceutical R&D centered on improving patient-level and population-  
355 based health outcomes and making data on drug safety, efficacy, and prices available to clinicians  
356 and researchers. Specifically, direct measures of morbidity and mortality outcomes should be used in  
357 clinical trials; the clinical and statistical significance and comparative effectiveness of new  
358 pharmaceutical products should be assessed; standards for postapproval effectiveness and safety  
359 monitoring should be implemented, particularly in Phase 4 of the drug development process, and  
360 independent publicly funded postmarketing surveillance studies should be conducted; comparative  
361 safety, efficacy, and pricing data should be disclosed in marketing and advertising activities; and  
362 federal and state public R&D support should be directed toward the development of new drugs with  
363 evidence of improving safety and efficacy and addressing unmet medical needs.
- 364 3. Mirror the VA system in designing and implementing a national drug formulary and utilization  
365 criteria for all federal and state public programs, including Medicare, Medicaid, the Department of  
366 Defense, and the Indian Health Service. The national drug formulary should also apply to all federal  
367 and state employee insurance programs.
- 368 4. Support universal drug coverage and affordable copayments and other cost sharing as part of the  
369 single-payer health system reform endorsed by APHA in 2021.[68]

370  
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